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HAROLD SKULSKY "I Know My Course": Hamlet's Confidence I SHALL PRESENTLY argue that it is seriously mistaken to see Hamlet as something of a skeptic about our knowledge of other minds. But I should like to point out that one can hardly be blamed for reading such a suggestion into his first extensive speech. What strongly tempts us in this direction is not merely that Hamlet denies the possibility, even in principle, of plucking out the heart of his own mystery, but that he gives us no grounds for exempting other people's mysteries One must keep in mind, for the sake of the Prince's nomenclature, that the rhetorical tradition in which he has been reared assumes the validity of the science of physiognomy and hence of the literary notatio-the description of a person's inward nature (or state) by means of outward signs that somehow unequivocally "denote" it.1 But at least in his own case, Hamlet argues here, notatio cannot succeed. "Forms, moods, shows of grief'
cannot "denote me truly," or at least they cannot do so "alone." For such signs are "customary"
and hence confined to what, as Hamlet has already willingly granted, is "common" or universal in human experience. And Hamlet's mind, by the very fact of being his, is not universal but "particular." To be sure, the Prince is careful to qualify the rigor of his negation; what signs cannot do "alone" they might still be able to do with help.
But the qualification does little more than tantalize. The fact is that what Hamlet has within, in his uncompromising phrase, "passeth show." If we rule out clairvoyance, it is a mystery irretrievably beyond the plucking out. And the tacit corollary, as we said, seems to be that other minds than Hamlet's, being equally unique and invisible, are equally enigmatic; and all attempts to penetrate them equally reduced to a futile indirection.
I. The Secrecy of Mind: Rival Traditions
Granted such a conclusion, Polonius' theory of espionage-that one can "by indirections find directions out" (II.i.66)-is as much an object lesson in fatal arrogance as his personal claim to "wisdom" and "reach." For as we watch him plying the craft of "lawful espial" (III.i.32) it becomes increasingly obvious that one indirection can lead only to another. The bait of falsehood he teaches Reynaldo to angle with is really good only for catching carps of rumor; the conversation on which he and Claudius eavesdrop, and of which he is so unhappy an interpreter, clearly does not interpret itself; and the sickly disarray of Hamlet's visit to Ophelia has nothing to do with love-if (as a Rosalind would add2) it ever does. The clues and symptoms available to Polonius, in short, fail to vindicate the natural history of human behavior that he so emphatically prefers to ethics and first philosophy, to inquiring "What majesty should be, what duty is, / Why day is day, night night, and time is time" (n.ii.87-88). And the preference is a hubristic prelude to the failure; rather than waste his time in schoolboy "expostulation" on the what and why of formal and final causality, the royal councillor has proudly offered his employers a look at the how, an opportunity to "find out the cause of this effect" by rehearsing a probable "declension" of efficient causes:
And he repulsed-a short tale to makeFell into a sadness, then into a fast, -his metaphor is as decorous for the pursuits of science as for those of "policy." For it is the figurative root of terms, like indagatio, investigatio, and even methodus, very dear to commentaries on the study of second causes.
To be sure, the only sort of evidence that can serve as a "trail of policy" will be, in Claudius' phrase (II.i. 1), the "drift of circumstance." But as Claudius concedes, the councillor's "positive" assertions have never been wrong, and on this record Polonius declares himself willing to stake his life: "Take this from this, if this be otherwise" (n.ii.156).
The irony of the rhetorical forfeit is that Polonius will eventually be made to pay it in earnest, but rhetoric or not, the pledge that goes with it implies a confidence in the force of circumstantial evidence that rises to Faustian audacity:
If circumstances lead me, I will find Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed Within the centre. (ii.ii. In profundo veritas demersa. Even if the mouthless cave of truth in Democritus' apophthegm3 were to be taken literally, Polonius assures us, he would trust his "essays of bias" to guide him down to it; that the abyss in question is merely figurative is presumably an added reason for confidence.
What we are listening to, then, is far from simple rodomontade. The grandeur, by the standards of his age, of Polonius' folly can perhaps be best appreciated by seeing how a more prudent and orthodox contemporary handles the same old saw:
And the great mocking-Master mockt not the When he said, "Truth was buried deepe below. For how may we to others things attaine, When none of vs his owne soule vnderstands?
For which the Divell mockes our curious braine, When, "Know thy selfe" his oracle commands. 4 Selves, in short, are so difficult to apprehend that we are little the wiser about them when they happen to be our own. And in the human animal this difficulty is, if anything, compounded by the indulgence of a perverse talent. Nemo non est dissimulator, as the schoolboy tag has it.5 Man the mimic of creation, after his Fall, becomes man the dissembler. "The heart," observes Jeremiah (xvii.9), "is deceitful above all things"-inscrutabile in the Vulgate-"and desperately wicked: who can know it?" Fittingly enough, it is the most For it is clear that brevity cannot be the "soul" of any wit of which tediousness could be called "the limbs and outward flourishes," and this not merely because brevity and tediousness are incompatible, but because both exist on a single plane: both, in fact, are "outward." The "soul" of an utterance, whatever it might be, is not its length. One can hardly imagine Claudius making the same mistake, haunted as he is, even in contexts that would seem to warrant it least, by the image of "the owner of a foul disease" who, "to keep it from divulging, let it feed / Even on the pith of life" (iv.i. [21] [22] Moreover, it was possible, by embracing the We began by considering Hamlet's insistence that his state of mind, being as unique as what contains it, is no less ineffably private. On the strength of that passage one might expect him to be anything but cordial to his adversaries' faith in the technology of spying, much less to the a priori assurances of the Neoplatonists. But a harder look at the play as a whole disappoints this expectation.
For the strange valediction with which it opens, to a sentinel relieved from duty "sick at heart," is no mere flourish. The hero of our play will be not only a man who might have made a soldier, "had he been put on," and who has effectively been relieved of his vigil by the time we bid him farewell but one also who, though he scorns to be troubled by "gaingiving" (v.ii.226), admits in the very same breath "how ill all's here about my heart" (1. 223); who defies augury (1. 230) precisely because he is far from dismissing it; who characteristically "prophesies" that his dying wish will be granted KING. So is it, if thou knew'st our purposes.
HAML. I see a cherub that sees them.
(iv.iii. [48] [49] [50] This easy sense of his own discernment colors the ideal of friendship that first appears in his sudden recognition of "Horatio!-or I do forget myself" (I.ii.l61). To forget Horatio would be to forget Hamlet for the same reason that claiming to know another's excellence, taken strictly, is a form of boasting: "I dare not confess that, lest I compare with him in excellence; but to know a man well were to know himself" (v.ii.145-47). All that Hamlet can say without self-praise is that if any man is known to be well endowed ("known well"), that man is Laertes ("himself"). For the person one knows in the strict sense-and this is the basis of Hamlet's quibble-is oneself, in the first or second degree. Such a knowledge is pure introspection and therefore incomparably more certain than any mere report, however close to the It is, however, more typical of the Prince to refer the task (II.ii. 178-79) of picking his one honest man out of ten thousand to a faculty other than intuition. Perhaps to our surprise, he appears to be in very cordial agreement with Polonius' view that men's "adoption" may be "tried" (i.iii.62); more than tried, he assures us in fact: "seal'd" with finality (IiI.ii.70). Such trial, to be sure, is no business for amateurs: "You would play upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass; and there is much music, excellent voice, in this little organ, yet cannot you make it speak" (m.ii.380-85). Guildenstern cannot pluck out the heart of a human mystery because he has not the "skill" (1. 378) of eliciting a significant response in the first place; he cannot make me speak because he does not "know my stops." And even if he knew them well enough to rival the superhuman virtuosity of Lady Fortune, the will to conceal- Monstrous as it may be that the player can feign a passion, the fact remains that he does so only by generating in his soul "a dream of passion." Thus, whenever his "function" is "suiting with forms to his conceit," one may safely take it for granted that those forms emanate from the "working" of a soul that has already been "forced" to the same But he has no intention of having himself taught what he is already sure he knows. He spares them a breach of "secrecy" by speaking for them. Even here he forgoes an opportunity to test his assumption, for by exploring his loss of mirth with such memorable diligence he effectively avoids fulfilling his promise to tell them why they were sent for, and ends instead by changing the subject. What he really wants to know, of course, is whether they will "deal justly" with him by his high standardswhether their confession will be spontaneous or hesitant. Since he has been keeping an eye on them (as he tells us in an aside) he will have had all the answer he is after by the time he gets to his second question, and thus his final plea, "If you love me, hold not off," is more verdict than exhortation.
It will be noted that the Prince attempts to lull suspicion by being, as Rosencrantz reports, "niggard of question; but of our demands / Most free in his reply" (m.i. [13] [14] . Though, to be sure, he does not in fact lull suspicion-his interviewers have no difficulty in perceiving that there was "much forcing of his disposition" (1. 12)-his tactic of calculated loquacity is clearly far subtler than the frigid and obvious policy of noncommitment Polonius recommends to Laertes: "Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice; / Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgement" (I.iii.68-69). But once more, whatever Polonius' limitations as a theoretician for his son's benefit, his practice as explained to Reynaldo does not differ in essentials from Hamlet's. That practice, in a word, is to use a neutral generality, a dummy statement or question, as bait for the unmentioned particular one is trying to elicit. By this method you are bound to come, in Polonius' phrase, "more nearer / Than your particular demands will touch it" (Ii.i.l l-12).
As for any scruples that might have deterred the Prince from retaliating so adroitly in kindand he mentions none-there was no lack of ancient authority to remind him that the wisdom of serpents was not unworthy of the embattled Christian. Even so absolute a partisan of truthfulness as Augustine is brought to admit, in the course of his invective Contra Mendacium, the permissibleness on occasion of prudently hiding the facts under a kind of dissembling, and Jerome produces the scriptural precedents for an avid pos- It seems it is as proper to our age To cast beyond ourselves in our op
As it is common for the younger sc To lack discretion.
These victories over the stupid or annuated are suspiciously cheap. As v they may be Pyrrhic as well.
We have been considering indication let shares Polonius' dubious addiction of worldly knowledge that went into ti tion of many a Renaissance common] and that usually took the form of ster unlike the Theophrastan character. Si this is, it is not entirely unprepared sure, we are not surprised at all to fin' in his little aphorism on age and ye "common" and "proper" as synonyn later discovered reading "words, worc
There is a double irony, then, in the sp man who sneers at "these tedious (Il.ii.223) and at the same time sees so ( the child actors who satirize their grown "exclaim against their own succession'
Half of the irony, of course, is that t own "succession" is not to be. But the is that the old fool he exclaims againsi who also went to "university" and a himself on being a "good actor" (in very much his fellow enthusiast of ed eralities.
ly acknowlage whose is attention
As we have seen, the notatio does not always fail Hamlet; as wit, certainly, he captures the trick of it no less adroitly than Overbury or the Hamlet has no difficulty in blowing the like of s that Hamn-Q^^^^^ ^ ^ ^^gj s that Ham-Osric to his trial, and thus far perhaps is not to to the sort be blamed for expecting Gertrude to see in the ie composi-"outward habit" of Claudius a mystic resemblance place book, ("like a mildew'd ear," III.iv.64) to his secret crime, eotypes not or for reasoning from the elder Hamlet's manly rpnrising as form to his "wholesomeness," though none other for . T e than the ghost has already reminded him that d Polonius, "lewdness" can come a-courting "in a shape of outh, using heaven" (i.v.54). Among Shakespeare's more adns, whereas mirable people, after all, the belief in such a reladred lapses tion dies very hard. "There is a fair behavior in inslsted on thee, Captain," says Viola in Twelfth Night, Where Gertrude sees mere madness hatching dove's eggs, Claudius correctly awaits the emergence of a hawk. Hamlet's mimicry thus ends by failing of the total ambiguity that Ophelia's genuine madness achieves only too well:
Her speech is nothing. Yet the unshaped use of it doth move The hearers to collection. They aim at it, And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts.
(Iv.v. [7] [8] [9] [10] But the subtler irony of this miscalculation is that the success of Hamlet's "disposition," independently diagnosed by both Polonius and Ophelia as "ecstasy" (ii.i.102, mii.i.168), very nearly defeats the purpose of the Prince's interview with his mother. For it is precisely from her own "ecstasy" that Hamlet hopes to save Gertrude by an appeal to rational choice, or rather to sense, which to ecstasy was ne'er so thrall'd But it reserv'd some quantity of choice, To serve in such a difference. (Iii.iv. [74] [75] [76] Yet, after the ghost's interruption the Prince's own medical record catches up with him: how to prove that one's reforming zeal is not another of one's fits-"that I essentially am not in madness"
(1. 187)-when one can think of no outward show "that can denote me truly"? There is nothing for it but to retract this last opinion. Hamlet proposes an impromptu series of tests: The logical form of this little poem is easy to mistake, so it is worthwhile to point out that the series of imperatives, like those of Donne's familiar "Song," embodies an a fortiori argument of the following type: (1) You might far more easily be unsure about these matters than about whether I love. (In Donne's "Song," you might more easily catch a falling star than find an honest woman.) (2) But it is impossible to be unsure about these matters. (3) Therefore, it is, if anything, doubly impossible to be unsure of my love. The second premise, of course, will not bear scrutiny. While it would indeed be a contradiction in terms to doubt -that is, to suspect-that truth is a liar, the other two statements are so far from being closed issues in this sense that they are (at the time of Shakespeare's writing) the subject of noisy disagreement among savants. One recent writer contrives to save Hamlet from this intellectual gaffe by sacrificing his rhetorical point: the Prince is simply contrasting the indisputable fact of his love with the mere hypotheses of science. 
